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Americans of all races and income levels recognize homeownership as a quintessential part of 
the American dream. This belief, along with federal policy that encourages homeownership and 
increased access to credit, has contributed to a dramatic rise in the number of families that own 
their home, particularly among low-income and minority households.  In addition, rising 
homeownership in the first part of this decade contributed substantially to neighborhood 
revitalization, and brought much needed investment into low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods. The recent subprime meltdown and rising foreclosures, however, threaten these 
gains.  In this study, I use 2007 foreclosure data from Contra Costa County, California, to 
examine how foreclosures are distributed across neighborhoods, and to identify the 
neighborhood characteristics that are associated with foreclosure.  I find that foreclosures are 
directly associated with subprime lending and that both subprime lending and foreclosures are 
concentrated in neighborhoods with high proportions of minority residents, lower-income 
households, and less educated households. These results have important policy implications for 
mortgage lending regulations and housing policies moving forward.  
 
 
* This article was developed from the author‟s Master‟s thesis completed Spring 2008 for the 
Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California, Berkeley. Kristin L. 
Perkins is now a Program Evaluator for the New York City Department of Housing Preservation 
and Development.  The author would like to thank Professor Karen Chapple, University of 
California, Berkeley, for her guidance throughout this research. She would also like to thank 
Carolina Reid and her staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for their comments on 
this paper.  
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Introduction 
At nearly 70 percent in 2005, the rate of homeownership reached a historic high in the United 
States.  Much of the increase in homeownership in the 1990s, a gain of four to five percent, or 
nearly 12 million new homeowners, came from marked increases in the number of low-income 
and minority households that became homeowners. A number of factors contributed to this rise, 
including a strong economy and low unemployment, low interest rates, greater access to credit, 
and government policies that encouraged homeownership, particularly among low-income and 
minority households. In addition, the 1990s saw significant innovation in mortgage credit, and 
the expansion of the subprime mortgage market. For example, the share of FHA loans, which 
were at one time the only option for many lower-income borrowers, declined steeply in the last 
decade, to a low of  a 2.7 percent market share in 2006 (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2007). 
Instead, originations of subprime loans and other “affordability products,” such as mortgages 
with interest-only and payment-option features designed to lower initial monthly payments but 
with higher risks of upward adjustment, grew rapidly and became a large share of the mortgage 
market. In 2002, these affordability products totaled less than five percent of all mortgage 
originations; by 2005, they accounted for fully 38 percent of originations (Joint Center for 
Housing Studies 2007).  
 While subprime and other affordability mortgage products may have helped many 
households enter homeownership, in other cases they led to irresponsible and unsustainable 
lending practices. House prices increased markedly through 2005, and some households used 
these mortgage products to help them become homeowners in an appreciating market. When 
prices started to decline, many homeowners found themselves owing more than their homes were 
worth and were therefore unable to refinance their mortgages (Yellen 2008).  These house price 
declines, coupled with poor underwriting standards and unaffordable “affordability” products, 
led to a rapid growth in the foreclosure rate, particularly among subprime, adjustable interest rate 
loans (see Figure 1).   2 
Figure 1: National Foreclosure Rates by Loan Type
 
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey 
    
California has been particularly hard hit both by the growth in subprime lending and 
subsequent foreclosures.  According to one estimate, 52,000 homes in California were lost to 
foreclosure in 2007, an increase of over 200 percent as compared to 2006 (CA Senate 2008). 
This rise in foreclosures in California was sudden and substantial, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Foreclosure Rates in California
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As of July 2007, California was home to four of the top ten cities in the United States for 
foreclosure activity, and foreclosure was affecting two percent of the state‟s homeowners. Figure 
3 shows that in the Bay Area, the distribution of foreclosures has been uneven, with the highest 
rates of foreclosure being concentrated in cities in Contra Costa and Alameda County. 
Source: Lender Processing Services, Inc. Applied Analytics, November 2008 
 
 
Researchers are beginning to untangle what factors influence subprime lending and 
foreclosures at the neighborhood level to assess what types of neighborhoods are most likely to 
be affected by negative spillover effects of foreclosures.  Research has shown that there is a 
strong geographic concentration of subprime lending where there is a large population of Black 
homeowners, and the median incomes of both census tracts and individual borrowers are 
inversely associated with the share of subprime lending in a neighborhood and the likelihood of a 
borrower receiving a subprime versus prime loan, respectively (Calem et al. 2004; Newman and 
Figure 3: Foreclosure Rates in the Bay Area   4 
Wyly 2004). In the Dallas metropolitan area, neighborhoods that are 90 percent Black have 30 
percent more subprime lending than neighborhoods that are 90 percent white, even after 
controlling for other neighborhood characteristics (Apgar and Herbert 2005).  This uneven 
concentration of subprime lending can also lead to neighborhood distress.  As Newman and 
Wyly (2004) show, the geographic distribution of subprime lending in Essex County, New 
Jersey is closely associated with the geographic pattern of foreclosures. In Chicago, Immergluck 
and Smith (2005) found that even after controlling for economic and demographic 
characteristics, for every 100 additional subprime loans made in such a neighborhood, nine 
additional foreclosures would occur. In a study of three counties in California, Lanzerotti (2006) 
also found an association between the prevalence of high-cost loans and the prevalence of 
Notices of Default. 
The concentration of subprime lending in certain neighborhoods and the increased 
likelihood of foreclosure among subprime loans is important because of the negative spillover 
effects of foreclosure, and the possibility that concentrated foreclosures will not only negatively 
affect the distressed borrowers, but that they will threaten the stability of the neighborhood as 
well.  Foreclosures in lower-income neighborhoods in particular often lead to vacant, boarded-up 
and abandoned properties, contributing to physical disorder, crime, and disinvestment 
(Immergluck and Smith 2006a).  Other negative spillover effects include lost rent to landlords, 
reduced sales by local businesses, reduced property values, and increased crime and municipal 
costs (Apgar et al. 2005). In Chicago, researchers estimated that every foreclosure within 1/8-
mile is associated with a 0.9 percent reduction in sales price in the surrounding properties; in 
lower-income neighborhoods, however, every foreclosure within 1/8-mile is associated with a 
1.44 percent reduction (Immergluck and Smith 2006a).  The more property values go down, the 
harder it becomes for homeowners to refinance their loans. If homes surrounding foreclosed 
properties were financed with subprime ARMs, once the loans reset to their fully indexed rates, 
homeowners may not be able to refinance if their property values have decreased. Increased 
crime may also reinforce negative effects of foreclosure and make neighborhoods less desirable 
to potential buyers of homes put on the market by distressed homeowners. This can lead to a 
vicious cycle of neighborhood decline, where a preponderance of foreclosures, and the resulting 
negative effects on property values, may lead other borrowers to foreclose even if they would not 
have defaulted otherwise.   
This study expands the existing literature on subprime lending and foreclosure by using 
empirical data to test a number of hypotheses about the relationship between neighborhood 
characteristics and foreclosures in Contra Costa County, California. Using local foreclosure data 
from 2007, I examine how foreclosures are distributed across neighborhoods and identify 
neighborhood characteristics associated with foreclosure. Specifically, I examine what 
neighborhood characteristics are associated with high foreclosure rates, to assess whether or not 
some types of neighborhoods may be more vulnerable to the negative spillover effects of 
foreclosure, therefore warranting public policy to regulate subprime lending and/or public 
investments to help stabilize the neighborhood.   5 
Empirical Analysis 
To better understand the relationship between foreclosures and neighborhoods, I examine 
patterns of foreclosure in 2007 in Contra Costa County, California.  Contra Costa County is part 
of the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area. In 2005, its estimated population was 1,023,400, and 
three of its cities, Antioch, Concord, and Richmond, had populations over 100,000.  The county 
has a diverse, yet somewhat segregated, population, with Black and low-income communities 
concentrated in western cities, higher income and white communities concentrated in the central 
area of the county, and Latinos concentrated in both the older western cities and rapidly growing 
eastern communities. Since 1990, over a third of the county‟s population growth has occurred in 
the eastern cities of Antioch, Brentwood and Oakley; Brentwood‟s population alone increased 
over 300 percent.  
Contra Costa is therefore an interesting case study for an analysis of neighborhood 
foreclosures, because it has both older, minority neighborhoods and new suburban developments 
within its borders. Research has shown that these two types of neighborhoods received 
disproportionate shares of subprime loans, and therefore are at the greatest risk of delinquencies 
and foreclosures. In a national study, Mayer and Pence (2008) found that subprime lending 
during the housing boom was concentrated in both inner-city neighborhoods, where there tend to 
be more minority and low-income residents, and rapidly growing suburbs and exurbs. Subprime 
mortgages are also concentrated in ZIP-codes (used as a proxy for neighborhoods) with high 
proportions of Black and Hispanic residents, and high unemployment rates (Mayer and Pence 
2008). 
Due to data limitations, much of the existing research on foreclosures is focused at the 
metro or state level.  Yet it is valuable to understand how these dynamics play out in more local 
real estate markets, especially when it comes to developing policies to stabilize communities 
affected by concentrated foreclosures.  This paper uses four separate data sources to analyze the 
relationship between foreclosures and neighborhood characteristics at the census tract level: the 
U.S. Census, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), median housing sales prices from 
Contra Costa County, and Notice of Trustee Sale listings from www.foreclosures.com.   
 
Methodology    
Using HMDA data, I approximate the share of subprime lending in each census tract in Contra 
Costa County. HMDA data does not explicitly state which loans are subprime; it does, however, 
categorize loans based on interest rate spreads, which allows users to identify higher priced (or 
high cost) loans, and use these as a proxy for subprime loans.
1 Higher priced loans are defined as 
first-lien loans that have a rate spread of three percent above the Treasury rate and second-lien 
                                                 
1 Do and Paley (2007) and LaCour-Little (2007) both argue that the HMDA high cost measure may not be a reliable 
proxy for subprime loans. HMDA rate-spread reporting is based on Treasury rates for loans of comparable maturity, 
but loan pricing is often determined by a loan’s expected duration, not its stated maturity. Both studies found that the 
flattening of the Treasury yield curve significantly impacted the increase in the number of high-cost loans reported 
in 2005 and 2006 over 2004.    6 
loans with a rate spread of five percent above the Treasury rate. HMDA‟s record of high cost 
loans is the best approximation of subprime lending available to the public.  
  Data on neighborhood demographic and socio-economic characteristics were obtained 
from the 2000 Census. There are obvious limitations to using the decennial census, as 
demographic and housing stock changes in rapidly growing areas like eastern Contra Costa 
County will not be reflected in the data, especially at the end of a decade when this study was 
conducted. Decennial census data, however, are the best estimates available for census tract-level 
geographies. The American Community Survey and intercensal population estimates do not 
provide disaggregated data at the census tract (proxy for neighborhood) level.  
Data on local house price changes, based on sale price data for single-family homes, 
between 2002 and 2007 were obtained at the zip code level from IHP Capital Partners. Using 
these house price data, I created two house price indices that reflect the change in prices between 
2002 and 2007. The first index measures house price appreciation from 2002 to 2005, and the 
second index measures change in house values from 2005 to 2007.  
Foreclosures in Contra Costa County are public information and are filed at the county 
clerk recorder‟s office. I obtained these data through foreclosures.com, a third-party vendor that 
assembles the data from the clerk‟s records and makes it available to the public in electronic 
form.
 2  Foreclosures.com compiles listings of properties at three stages in the foreclosure 
process: Notice of Default, Auction (Notice of Trustee Sale), and Real-Estate-Owned. None of 
these three stages, however, is exactly foreclosure. I eliminated Notices of Default as a proxy for 
foreclosure because a Notice of Default is the first legal action lenders take in the foreclosure 
process in California; very few properties listed under Notice of Default are foreclosed. Auction 
and Real-Estate-Owned are better approximations of foreclosure, as Auction dates are set 21 
days before a property is to be sold, and Real-Estate-Owned lists the properties held by the 
lender because there were no bidders at the foreclosure auction. I chose Auction as an 
approximation of foreclosure because this list better estimates the number of homeowners in 
distress than does Real-Estate-Owned. The loans on some properties listed for auction are cured 
before the sale date and thus do not reach foreclosure; the number of Real-Estate-Owned 
properties underestimates foreclosure because it does not include any properties purchased at 
auction. Between January 2, 2007, and December 7, 2007, there were 5,689 foreclosure auctions 
scheduled in Contra Costa County.  I eliminated multiple listings of the same property and was 
left with 5,227 unique properties facing auction in 2007. 
Using a geographic information system, I matched each of the property addresses to its 
census tract. 
3 Once the properties in foreclosure were mapped, I calculated the number of 
                                                 
2 Though it is not possible to determine the accuracy of any proprietary foreclosure database, I chose 
www.foreclosures.com because it was recommended by a colleague as having a complete record of defaults and 
foreclosures in Contra Costa County. Foreclosures.com also permits users to download 100 records at a time versus 
other sites that allow only one record at a time.  
3 The raw data available from foreclosures.com does not include the census tract in which the property listed for 
auction is located. To match properties listed by foreclosures.com to census tracts, the unique properties scheduled 
for auction were geocoded to a 2006 street shapefile, resulting in a match rate of 93 percent.    7 
foreclosures per census tract and begin analyzing the relationships between the foreclosure rate 
in a census tract (the number of foreclosures divided by number of housing units) and 
neighborhood demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Table 1 presents the variables I 
assessed, as well as the expected relationship between the variable and the incidence of 
foreclosure. 
 
Table 1. Conceptual Relationship of Neighborhood Characteristics to Foreclosure 
Associated with a Higher Foreclosure Rate   Associated with a Lower Foreclosure 
Rate  
High Cost Lending 
(First or second lien loans with interest rates 3% 
and 5% above Treasury, respectively) 
Median Income 
Proportion Population Black  Education 
Proportion Population Hispanic   
Households speaking Spanish   
Recent Immigrants 
(Foreign-born individuals that entered United States 
in previous five years) 
 
Single-Person Households 
(Householder living alone under Household Type) 
 
Unemployment Rate   
Poverty  
(Percent population below poverty level) 
 
Renter Burden 
(Median gross rent as a % of household income) 
 
Owner Burden 
(Median monthly expenses for units with a 
mortgage as a % of household income) 
 
House Price Index  
(Two indices: one measuring house price change 
from 2002 to 2005, the other from 2005 to 2007) 
   8 
Findings  
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables of interest in the dataset.  The summary 
statistics demonstrate the diversity of neighborhoods in Contra Costa County. Racially, the 
County remains quite segregated.  Some tracts have very few Black and Hispanic residents while 
in other tracts minorities make up two-thirds of the population. This diversity is also 
demonstrated by the proportion of homeowners who are Black in each neighborhood; throughout 
the county this ranges from zero to 81 percent. The share of households speaking Spanish, 
ranging from two percent to 66 percent, and the percent of the population that are recent 
immigrants, between zero and 44 percent, further show how Contra Costa County neighborhoods 
differ from each other. Education and median family income also have wide ranges. In the least 
educated tract only two percent of adults over age 25 have a college degree compared to 91 
percent in the most educated tract. Median family income ranges from $28,000 to over $200,000, 
and the poverty rate is between half a percent and 34 percent. Likewise, housing cost burden for 
both renters and owners differs widely across the county, with renters spending between 19 and 
46 percent, and owners spending between 22 and 54 percent of their income on housing.  
Despite these differences, the entire region saw rapid house price appreciation and rising 
housing unaffordability in the first part of the decade.  The first house price index variable 
indicates that all tracts experienced at least a 39 percent increase in house prices between 2002 
and 2005; house prices appreciated by at least 50 percent in 144 tracts, while in seven tracts 
prices appreciated over 100 percent. The second index variable measuring change in house prices 
between 2005 and 2007 shows that the average tract had only an eight percent increase, and in 28 
tracts house prices decreased. Figure 4 shows that large areas of Contra Costa County saw 
significant house price declines between 2005 and 2007. 
   
Figure 4: Change in Housing Prices by Zip Code in Contra Costa County 
Source: IHP Capital 
Partners 




Table 2. Summary Statistics of Contra Costa County Census Tracts 
 
  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Foreclosure Rate (per housing 
unit) 
0%  5.65%  1.18%  1.1% 
Number of Foreclosures  0  318  29  39 
Loans High Cost  0.00%  56.51%  23.14%  13.8% 
Percent Black  0%  68%  9.54%  13.1% 
Percent Hispanic  1%  64%  16.87%  14.1% 
Households speaking Spanish  1.62%  66.29%  16.27%  13.1% 
Recent Immigrants  0%  44.6%  17.17%  9.5% 
Percent Single-Person 
Households 
1.22%  47.41%  8.97%  6.3% 
Percent Homeowners who are 
Black 
0%  81.4%  8.4%  14.6% 
Unemployment Rate  0.3%  17.1%  5.15%  3.3% 
College Graduates  1.9%  91.42%  36.69%  21.6% 
Poverty Rate  0.56%  34.13%  8.68%  7.2% 
Median Family Income (2007$)  28,328  212,895  91,785  36,819 
Renter Burden (% income spent 
on housing) 
19%  46%  33%  4% 
Owner Burden  22%  54%  34%  5% 
House Price Index 2002-2005 









Median Year Built (foreclosed 
units) 
1918  2001  1966  18 
Median Year Built (all units)  1945  1995  1969  12 
N = 168         
Source: www.foreclosures.com (2007), HMDA (2006), U.S. Census (2000), SVP Market 
Research at IHP Capital Partners (2007) 
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In Figure 5, I map the distribution of foreclosures across the county. All but two of 
Contra Costa County‟s 168 census tracts had at least one foreclosure in 2007.  Yet again, 
significant geographic variation exists.  The tracts with the highest foreclosure rates are 
concentrated in the lower income and higher minority areas of western Contra Costa County 
(Richmond and San Pablo) and the new growth areas of eastern Contra Costa County (Antioch, 
Pittsburg, Brentwood and Oakley). In contrast, the tracts with the lowest foreclosure rate are 
concentrated in the central area of Contra Costa County, in Moraga, Orinda and Walnut Creek. 
El Cerrito, in Western Contra Costa County, is home to three of the lowest foreclosure rate 
tracts. These cities have relatively high median incomes and include some of the more 




To explore these relationships further, I compared the 10 tracts with the lowest 
foreclosure rate (measured as foreclosure per housing unit) to the 10 tracts with the highest 
foreclosure rate. Table 3 shows the results of a difference in means test of the demographic and 
socioeconomic variables in the 10 tracts with the lowest rates of foreclosure versus the 10 tracts 
with the highest rates of foreclosure.
 4   
                                                 
4 With the exception of the 2005-2007 house price index, all of the neighborhood characteristics significantly 
different in the 10 low-rate tracts and 10 high-rate tracts are also significantly different in the 84 census tracts with 
rates above the median foreclosure rate versus the 84 tracts with rates below the median, though the values are 
Figure 5: Foreclosure Rate per Housing Unit in Contra Costa County 
Source: Foreclosure.com, 2007   11 
Table 3. Differences between Tracts with Low and High Rates of Foreclosure 
 






Difference in Means 
Foreclosure Rate  0.0007  0.0399  -0.0391 (0.003)*** 
Number of Foreclosures  1.1  104.3  -103.2 (19.717)*** 
Loans High Cost (%)  0.0487  0.4210  -0.3724 (0.034)*** 
Percent Black  0.0321  0.2501  -0.2179 (0.071)*** 
Percent Hispanic  0.0582  0.2980  -0.2399 (0.048)*** 
Households speaking Spanish 
(%) 
0.0679  0.2736  -0.2056 (0.046)*** 
Recent Immigrants (% hhs)  0.1576  0.1923  -0.0347 (0.051) 
Percent Single-Person 
Households 
0.1467  0.0456  0.1012 (0.043)** 
Percent Black Homeowners  0.0136  0.2851  -0.2714 (0.094)*** 
Unemployment Rate  0.0581  0.0809  -0.0227 (0.023) 
College Graduates (%)  0.6610  0.1667  0.4943 (0.055)*** 
Poverty Rate  0.0460  0.1624  -0.1165 (0.038) *** 
Median Family Income (2007)  115,123  64,726  50,396 (14,954) *** 
Renter Burden  0.3100  0.3606  -0.0505 (0.017)*** 
Owner Burden  0.3204  0.3917  -0.0713 (0.030)** 
House Price Index 2002-2005 






0.0953 (0.052)*  
Median Year Built (foreclosed 
units) 
1961  1971  -10 (10.4)  
Median Year Built (all)  1963  1975  -12 (6.2)* 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level of confidence 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence 
  
First, the incidence of higher-priced lending is strongly associated with foreclosures. In 
tracts with high rates of foreclosure, the incidence of higher-priced lending was 37 percentage 
points higher than in tracts with low rates of foreclosure, supporting Newman and Wyly‟s (2004) 
finding that the spatial pattern of subprime lending is similar to the pattern of foreclosure in 
                                                                                                                                                             
slightly different. Two variables, recent immigrants and unemployment rate, are significant in the median-split 
model, but not the 10/10 model. The median-split model results are reported in Appendix A.    12 
Newark. Figure 6 shows the share of high cost lending in Contra Costa County. A comparison of 
Figure 6 to Figure 5 supports the strong positive association between rate of foreclosure and high 
cost lending. Nearly 80 percent of tracts with low rates of high cost lending have low rates of 
foreclosure (defined here as under 0.34 percent). In over 80 percent of tracts with over 30 percent 
high cost loans the rates of foreclosure were over 1.5 percent.




Second, race also matters.  There are over 20 percent more Black and Latino residents 
(and Spanish speaking households) in Contra Costa County‟s high foreclosure rate tracts than in 
low tracts. In addition, tracts with low rates of foreclosure have 27 percentage points fewer Black 
homeowners than tracts with high rates. Figure 7 illustrates the strong positive association 





                                                 
5 Foreclosure rate is classified as follows: low – under 0.34 percent, medium – between 0.34 percent and 1.5 percent, 
high – above 1.5 percent. Thus the “high” rate is not exceptionally high, but represents the top 33 percent of tracts in 
the county.  
Figure 6: Percent of High Cost Lending in Contra Costa County 
Source: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data, 2006   13 
 
 
Table 3 also shows that lower-income neighborhoods are more vulnerable to foreclosures 
than higher-income areas.  In Contra Costa County, the poverty rate in high foreclosure tracts is 
nearly four times the rate in low foreclosure tracts.  Overall earnings are higher in low 
foreclosure rate tracts as well. Families living in low foreclosure rate tracts earned $115,000 in 
2007, on average, while their counterparts in high foreclosure rate tracts earned just under 
$65,000.  There is a large and highly significant difference in the proportion of adults over age 
25 with at least a college degree in low rate tracts versus high rate tracts. Over 66 percent of 
adults have completed post-secondary education in tracts with low foreclosure rates, compared to 
only 17 percent in tracts with high rates. 
Contrary to my hypothesis, single-person households are more common in low 
foreclosure rate tracts. Low rate tracts have, on average, 10 percentage points more single-person 
households than high rate tracts. This does not support the hypothesis that single-person 
households in Contra Costa County are stretching to buy homes that they cannot afford on one 
income. What it might suggest, however, is that neighborhoods with many single-person 
households were not as vulnerable to foreclosure as neighborhoods with larger, single-family 
homes. Neighborhoods with more single-person households may be those with more modest, 
smaller homes, unlike the new neighborhoods in eastern Contra Costa County where newer, 
large homes for families were built. The single-person households variable does not account for 
housing tenure (i.e., the single-person households could be owners or renters), so it is possible 
that neighborhoods with more single-person households may have more renter households, too, 
and therefore be less vulnerable to high rates of foreclosure.  
Figure 7: Percent of Black Residents in Contra Costa County 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau   14 
Finally, there is also an association between house prices, housing affordability, and the 
incidence of foreclosures. The final relationship tested was the association between housing price 
change, measured with two indices of median house sales prices (the first between 2002 and 
2005 and the second between 2005 and 2007), and foreclosure rate. As suggested by Immergluck 
(2008), tracts with rapidly increasing housing prices were also more likely to have higher rates of 
foreclosure. Half of tracts with a low house price index (HPI) had low rates of foreclosure.
6 No 
tract with a low foreclosure rate experienced a house price increase of more than 60 percent. 
Ninety percent of tracts with high rates of foreclosure had price increases of over 60 percent 
between 2002 and 2005. In contrast, between 2005 and 2007 house prices appreciated less than 
four percent in half of tracts with high foreclosure rates, while in tracts with low foreclosure rates 
house appreciation continued: half of these tracts experienced house price increases of at least 15 
percent.  
All three of the housing price and burden indicators have the expected relationship to 
foreclosure: tracts with high rates of foreclosure have higher renter cost burdens and owner cost 
burdens than tracts with low rates. Renters in high rate tracts spend 36 percent of their income on 
housing compared to 31 percent in low rate tracts (both averages are over the accepted 
affordability standard of 30 percent). Owners in high rate tracts spend nearly 40 percent of their 
income on housing while owners in low rate tracts dedicate 32 percent to housing-related 
expenses. 
Overall, the differences between census tracts with low and high rates of foreclosure, and 
the association between neighborhood characteristics and foreclosure rates, support findings 
from previous research that foreclosure is associated with subprime lending and that both 
foreclosure and subprime lending are common in neighborhoods with high proportions of 
minority residents, lower-income households, and less educated households. Though many 
aspects of Contra Costa County are unique, it is possible to tentatively extend these findings to 
the broader San Francisco Bay Area, especially its more suburban areas, and possibly even to 
other areas in California and the United States struggling with foreclosure. The next section 
reviews policies to address the crisis and poses questions about the possible implications of 
foreclosure in specific neighborhoods. 
 
Policy responses and implications  
 
Federal, state and local government agencies are reacting to the foreclosure crisis and attempting 
to quickly develop policies that will both mitigate the negative effects of foreclosures on 
communities as well as prevent future loans from entering foreclosure. The mortgage industry, 
along with broader financial networks, and local community-based organizations (CBOs) are 
also addressing the foreclosure crisis, but in very different ways. This section reviews policy 
responses and connects these responses to the populations and neighborhoods affected by 
foreclosure. The first column in Table 4 presents policy recommendations made by government 
                                                 
6 A low HPI is under 1.5; all tracts had an HPI of at least 1.39 and the highest was 1.99.    15 
agencies, housing advocates and industry officials, from both the popular press and academic 
research. The middle column draws on the literature reviewed for this paper to describe the 
population likely affected by the policy mechanisms. The last column suggests areas in Contra 
Costa County that are most likely to be affected by the proposed policy recommendations.  
Table 4. Populations and Neighborhoods Affected by Foreclosure Prevention and  




Population Affected  Neighborhood Affected 
Require income verification 
and confirmation of ability to 
pay 
All  All 
Regulate predatory sales 
tactics of brokers (implement 
disclosure requirements 
and/or nationwide licensing 
system) 
Elderly, low-income minority 
neighborhoods, rural areas 
Central and Western region- Moraga, 
Walnut Creek, El Cerrito (elderly); 
Richmond, Pittsburg, Bay Point (low-
income); Richmond and Pittsburg 
(Black); Richmond, Concord, 
Brentwood, Pittsburg (Latino) 
Restrict subprime lending  Low income, African -
American homeowners 
Richmond, Pittsburg, Bay Point (low-
income); Richmond (Black homeowners) 
Restrict alternative mortgage 
products 
Moderate- to middle-income 
borrowers, minority 
households 
Richmond and Pittsburg (Black); 
Richmond, Concord, Brentwood, 
Pittsburg (Latino); Hercules, Concord, 
Walnut Creek (middle income) 
Lower Interest Rates  Minorities, low-income 
households, women, 
borrowers whose loans 
haven‟t yet reset, first time 
homebuyers 
Richmond and Pittsburg (Black); 
Richmond, Concord, Brentwood, 
Pittsburg (Latino) 
Relax restrictions for FHA, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Recent borrowers 
anticipating rate reset, 
borrowers with low 
downpayments 
Antioch, East Contra Costa, where 
housing prices higher and jumbo loans 
common 
Mortgage counseling, 
outreach to distressed 
borrowers 
Borrowers prone to 
aggressive subprime lending 
tactics, African-Americans 
and Latinos more likely to 
receive subprime loans 
Richmond and Pittsburg (Black); 
Richmond, Concord, Brentwood, 




areas with high housing price 
appreciation 
Richmond, Pittsburg, Bay Point (low-
income); Pittsburg, Antioch, Brentwood, 
Oakley (high appreciation) 
Freeze teaser rates on ARMs, 
place moratorium on 
foreclosures 
All borrowers, especially 
lower-income and minority 
households 
All areas; Richmond and Pittsburg 
(Black); Richmond, Concord, 
Brentwood, Pittsburg (Latino); 





Population Affected  Neighborhood Affected 
Increase housing finance 
agency bond allocation 
Lower-income borrowers and 
neighborhoods 
Richmond, Pittsburg, Bay Point (low-
income) 
Eviction protection for 
renters 
Renters in one- or two-family 
homes at risk of foreclosure 
All areas 
Allow delinquent 




blight, opportunity for 
vandalism) 
Richmond, Pittsburg, Bay Point (low-
income) 
Create/extend moratoria on 
foreclosures 
All neighborhoods, especially 
those with concentrated 
foreclosures 
All areas; Antioch, Brentwood, Pittsburg, 
Richmond, in particular 
Increased code enforcement, 
correcting violations 
All neighborhoods, especially 
those with concentrated 
foreclosures 
All areas; Antioch, Brentwood, Pittsburg, 
Richmond, in particular 
Resell REO as affordable 
homeownership or rental 
units 
All neighborhoods, especially 
those with concentrated 
foreclosures 
All areas; Antioch, Brentwood, Pittsburg, 
Richmond, in particular 
Sources (Policies): Elmendorf  2008, Andrews 2008 
 
Many of these foreclosure prevention policy responses will affect most borrowers, but 
some could be targeted to specific populations. Requiring income verification, lowering interest 
rates, and freezing teaser interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages will be helpful to all 
borrowers, and all neighborhoods in Contra Costa County. Restricting subprime lending, 
regulating predatory lending and encouraging mortgage counseling could be especially helpful to 
low-income and minority borrowers seeking mortgages, populations shown to be more 
vulnerable to these risky loans. In Contra Costa County, these policies would have notable 
influence in Richmond, Pittsburg and Bay Point, communities that on average have lower 
incomes and higher shares of minority residents.  Increasing the bond allocations of housing   17 
finance agencies might also benefit these communities, since the new funding would enable 
these agencies to purchase foreclosed units and redevelop them into affordable housing units, or 
provide “bridge loans” to households facing foreclosure. 
Other proposals, such as shared appreciation mortgages, will likely help lower-income 
borrowers and neighborhoods the most, and may provide the foundation for more sustainable 
homeownership going forward.  Shared appreciation mortgages allow lenders to gain from 
increases in housing value, but also force lenders to take on some of the risk, providing access to 
homeownership similar to a limited equity cooperative or community land trust. Shared 
appreciation mortgages could also be useful in areas of high housing appreciation, such as in 
eastern Contra Costa County, where homeownership was „out of reach‟ for many households.  
The second set of policy responses could be implemented to help stabilize neighborhoods 
affected by concentrated foreclosures. Eviction protection for renters, allowing borrowers to stay 
in their homes as renters, and foreclosure moratoria could all mitigate neighborhood distress, 
especially in the form of vacant and blighted units in lower-income neighborhoods. Once 
foreclosures have occurred, vacant and abandoned properties should be targeted by 
comprehensive code enforcement policies that not only record violations but actively seek 
resolutions. Public agencies could also work with local nonprofits and lenders to acquire REO 
properties, rehabilitate if necessary, and resell or rent units as affordable housing. These 
responses would be useful in all Contra Costa County neighborhoods, but may be especially 
effective at neighborhood stabilization in those areas with the highest rate of foreclosure, such as 
Antioch, Brentwood, Oakley, Pittsburg in eastern Contra Costa County and Richmond in western 
Contra Costa County.  
Former Federal Reserve Governor Edward Gramlich (2007) provided yet another way to 
think about policy responses to what he presciently saw as the risks of subprime lending.  He 
argued that providing an adequate supply of rental housing for individuals and households not 
ready or not interested in becoming homeowners (so that these households are not pushed into 
homeownership) is a critical piece of a sensible housing policy that does not overly promote 
homeownership for all families. This is a basic, yet counterintuitive suggestion since all of the 
focus of the subprime debate has been directed towards how the country can fix its 
homeownership market. It is not surprising that there has been little discussion about the role of 
rental housing because in the past few decades, the federal government has devoted many more 
resources to subsidizing homeownership than to rental housing. Not only would it be prudent to 
provide rental housing for individuals and households who need or want to remain renters, in 
addition, the households that will lose their homes and equity to foreclosure will likely end up in 
the rental market and will need adequate shelter.  
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Conclusion 
As the foreclosure crisis mushrooms and house values continue to decline, government agencies, 
researchers, and housing advocates are actively and creatively suggesting policy responses to 
prevent future foreclosures and stabilize neighborhoods affected by foreclosure. What we should 
also consider is how foreclosure may be counteracting investment in specific neighborhoods.  As 
noted at the beginning of this paper, government policies that encouraged homeownership 
among minorities and lower-income households, including the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA), contributed to the recent historically high homeownership rate, and other programs such 
as the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) and New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) helped 
revitalize distressed neighborhoods. Neighborhoods in Contra Costa County with higher 
proportions of minority and low-income residents, the same targets of government policies, are 
those that are experiencing higher rates of foreclosure. Are foreclosures putting the gains these 
neighborhoods may have made at risk? If so, neighborhood stabilization and foreclosure 
prevention programs should target these neighborhoods specifically to prevent them from 
reversing any progress they may have made.  
In addition, the current crisis should not be seen as an excuse to abandon the goal of 
affordable and sustainable homeownership.  Homeownership is one of, if not the, most important 
determinants of a family‟s wealth and the intergenerational transfer of wealth.  Designing 
policies to increase minority and low-income homeownership could positively affect household 
wealth and the financial well-being of children and future generations, if done responsibly.  
Particularly troubling is the effect the current foreclosure crisis may be having on the wealth gap 
between white and minority households.  Given that this paper has shown that both higher cost 
lending, as well as foreclosures, have been concentrated in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods, it is possible that the wealth gap will grow substantially, with negative 
implications for future generations as well. 
As we begin to understand more about the scale of the foreclosure crisis and its negative 
impacts on families and communities, it becomes clear that federal, state and local governments 
must act quickly to prevent additional foreclosures and stabilize neighborhoods affected. The 
scale of the crisis demands a multi-pronged approach. Cities and CBOs are reacting to the 
foreclosure crisis locally and implementing recovery measures, but they do not have the capacity 
to prevent future foreclosures on a wide scale. It is the responsibility of federal and state 
governments to aid local governments in implementing policies that will prevent or limit future 
foreclosures and stabilize neighborhoods affected by foreclosure. Without quick and thoughtful 
action by the federal government, we run the risk of reversing the gains of more than twenty 
years of community development investments in minority and low-income neighborhoods.    19 
 Appendix A 
Differences between Tracts with Low and High Rates of Foreclosures 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level of confidence 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level of confidence 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence 
 






Difference in Means 
Foreclosure Rate  0.0033  0.0202  -0.0169 (0.001) *** 
Number of Foreclosures  7.59  50.19  -42.59 (5.13)*** 
Loans High Cost (%)  0.1221  0.3408  -0.2187 (0.013)*** 
Percent Black  0.0290  0.1618  -0.1328 (0.017)*** 
Percent Hispanic  0.0765  0.2610  -0.1844 (0.017)*** 
Households speaking Spanish 
(%) 
0.0852  0.2403  -0.1551 (0.016)*** 
Recent Immigrants (% hhs)  0.1578  0.1855  -0.0277 (0.015)* 
Percent Single Households  0.1064  0.0731  0.0333 (0.009)*** 
Percent Black Homeowners  0.0210  0.1471  -0.1261 (0.020)*** 
Unemployment Rate  0.0356  0.0673  -0.0317 (0.005)*** 
College Graduates (%)  0.5268  0.2070  0.3198 (0.022)*** 
Poverty Rate  0.0520  0.1216  -0.0696 (0.010)*** 
Median Family Income (2007)  114,442  68,128  45,314 (4,483)*** 
Renter Burden  0.3171  0.3408  -0.0237 (0.006)*** 
Owner Burden  0.3183  0.3586  -0.0403 (0.007)*** 
House Price Index 2002-2005  1.5780  1.6783  -0.1003 (0.018)*** 
House Price Index 2005-2007  1.0829  1.0784  0.0045 (0.014) 
Median Year Built (foreclosed 
units) 
1965  1966  -1 (2.8) 
Median Year Built (all)  1967  1970  -2 (1.8)   20 
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